Re: Does the phrase " Russell's paradox " should be replaced with another phrase?

Dana subota, 22. prosinca 2012. 10:41:27 UTC+1, korisnik vldm10 napisao je:
> Here are some additional explanations regarding this post. Notice that there >is no concept, so that none of the objects can satisfy this concept. And this >means, that we cannot identify an object which satisfy this concept. Notice >that only objects which are identified by subject can satisfy the >corresponding concept. In other words, the unidentified objects can not >satisfy the subject's concept. So, before one checks whether a particular >object satisfies certain concept, he needs to identify the object. In another >words, only "known" objects can satisfy certain concept. Therefore, Russell's >paradox makes no sense, because there is no object that satisfies a concept >that is defined by Russell. In other words, no one can identify an object that >satisfies Russell's concept. So B. Russell was overlooked the identification >of objects (individuals). But the identification of an object is the simplest >way of the introducing the object.

When I speak here about objects and sets, I mean the following:

1.	The set has the elements.
2.	These elements are names that denote objects.
3.	I use Frege’s definition of the objects

>In my paper “Database design and data model founded on concept and knowledge >constructs”, at http://www.dbdesign11.com section 5.3 ” I introduced the >following definition: 5.3 Definition of Concept A concept is a construct which >determines one or both of the following: (i) A plurality of things in which >all the things satisfy the concept; (ii) A particular thing from the plurality >determined by (i). In order to identify an entity we use the following >procedures: Procedure1: Identifying the plurality. Procedure2: Identifying >individuals. Procedure2 is not effective without Procedure1. Note that >Procedure1 is related to the concepts, because concepts define extension
>(plurality), while Procedure2 is related to “identification” of objects.

Notice that Procedure2 in this definition can be based on the concept or identification. If we apply (3.3.3) to Procedure2, Procedure2 then becomes a process of identification.

The subject that performs the identification “knows” the corresponding objects or he “knows” the identifiers of these objects.

Notice that here we have two constructs; one is the set, the other is an element of this set. Here is one really trivial example, which may give a clearer picture about the concepts. There are persons who can see only black and white; there are persons who can not see any color.

It is now evident that the universal attributes strongly influence the functional capabilities of a subject. It is also evident that different subjects can identify different numbers of universal attributes from the same property (here we have the concept of color). By this trivial example I want to present the complexity of the concepts, as well as the importance of concepts as the mind-world link. This is not just a matter of concepts, this is also a matter of objects that satisfy this property (concept) and this is a matter of the identification of these objects. These examples from the real world show that Russell approach leaves out imortant parts and simplify concepts (properties) so much that a distorted impression of it is given. This oversimplification has far-reaching consequences.

In my opinion G. Frege was right. He understood that this is a matter of semantic procedure (not logic). Therefore, we can fix Frege’s theory by adding the process of identification of the objects which satisfy the corresponding concept.

Vladimir Odrljin Received on Mon Dec 31 2012 - 10:09:42 CET