Does the phrase " Russell's paradox " should be replaced with another phrase?
Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2012 02:13:35 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <d31990b4-9552-470c-a6b8-148466169aa7_at_googlegroups.com>
On December 5, 2012, I wrote on this user group the following: “ I distinguish real objects from abstract objects. I defined abstract objects and the identification of each of these objects. See (3.3.3), section 3.3, from the above mentioned paper “Database design and data model founded on concept and knowledge constructs”, (at http://www.dbdesign11.com ) In my paper only the "m-attributes" are determined with our perceptual abilities. All other (more complex) objects are defined recursively, according to their complexity
(see m-entities, m-relationships and m-states).
The complex objects are determined by our mental activities.
We can notice that E. Codd not distinguish these objects. He did not even notice these objects.
On the other hand, we can notice that (3.3.3) is important because it defines the relationship between concepts and identification, that is, it determines the relationship between the relation of satisfy and the corresponding identification. “
So, (3.3.3) means that there is another mind-world link.
This link is the identification.
Because of this, there are two mind-world links; these two links
are the concept and identification. Thus, the "identification" is
what is missing in Frege's theory.
My conclusion is as follows:
- Gottlob Frege was right. He has not made a mistake. But what is missing in his theory, it is the identification.
- Bertrand Russell's paradox is not paradox. This is not a matter which is about the using of classical logic, nor matter which is about logical tricks. This is not matter about a proof. This is a matter which is about the effective semantic procedure. This procedure is presented in my (here mantioned) paper. Note that, G. Frege introduced and defined semantics and concepts. So Russell was wrong.
In my opinion, (3.3.3) gives the answers to other questions.
One such question is the following: Does the "identification"
is a non-conceptual representation?
My answer is: It depends on how you are looking at things that are
related to "identification".
(3.3.3) gives the answers also to the following question:
For example, some subject (a person) is not capable to identify
some three numbers from a finite set of natural numbers.
Is it possible to set a concept on this set of natural numbers for
this subject (person)?
The answer is no. (See universal attributes at my paper “Database design
and data model founded on concept and knowledge constructs”, section 3.3.
Note that I use term “matching” instead of “identification”, because
sometimes the identification is not direct. )
Vladimir Odrljin Received on Tue Dec 11 2012 - 11:13:35 CET