Re: Fitch's paradox and OWA

From: Marshall <marshall.spight_at_gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2009 20:14:05 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <c2dea122-5230-4057-a06a-787ae913247f_at_j14g2000yqm.googlegroups.com>


On Dec 30, 7:51 pm, stevendaryl3..._at_yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:
> Nam Nguyen says...
> >Daryl McCullough wrote:
> >> By the way, I haven't thought about it a huge amount, but I
> >> don't have any problems with the paradox, because I don't
> >> accept the premise: Every true proposition is potentially knowable.
>
> >> It seems to me that sufficiently complex true propositions may never
> >> be known.
>
> >But how can we know it's true in the first place, when its being true
> >can't be known?
>
> I didn't say that we can *know* it is true. That's my point---something
> can be true without anyone knowing that it is true. It might be true,
> for example, that there is an even number of grains of sand in the world, but we
> may never find that out. Is e^pi rational? We may never find out.

I believe Nam is roughly of the opinion that if we can't know which one of {true, false} a sentence is, then we have no basis for saying it must be one or the other. I seem to recall being less than completely
clear on that point myself sometime in the past, in re the halting problem, and getting a sound sci.logic thrashing by some guy as a result. His name was Darren McColor, or anyway it was something like that. Boy was I embarrassed!

Marshall Received on Thu Dec 31 2009 - 05:14:05 CET

Original text of this message