Re: ORACLE on the DEC Alpha AXP

From: Ruth Larson <rlarson_at_nswc-wo.nswc.navy.mil>
Date: 15 Dec 92 14:42:20 GMT
Message-ID: <1992Dec15.144220.25349_at_relay.nswc.navy.mil>


Steve Schow writes:
>We routinely use the OPS$LOGIN feature of Oracle for all of our users. This
>way they don't have to worry about anything once they are logged onto the
>UNIX machine. They just type program / to run it with their UNIX login info.
 

>Question:
 

>When we create a new user as follows:
 

> grant connect to ops$user identified by bogus;
 

>and we actually use the word 'bogus' as the oracle password.
 

>Does this mean that user ops$user could login to Oracle with either
>the /, which would use his UNIX login info, or with 'bogus' as the
>password?

Yes, this is EXACTLY the case.

>Could a user go into sql*plus with any convienient name and type
 

> connect ops$user/bogus
 

>to get into that user's oracle account

Again, Yes.

>We routinely use bogus to define new oracle users, but I am concerned about
>security loop holes. We also use a number of macintosh client products that
>use the ops$user with the UNIX password to login. I am beginning to think
>that we should make sure that the Oracle password is the same as the UNIX
>password and NOT use bogus for everyone?!_at_#%

I would NOT suggest making the Oracle password the same as the system password. In many systems the logon password should only be known by the individual user. However, there's now need for *anyone* to have to know the ops$ password for an individual user - he/she doesn't need to know it, and the DBA can always reset it without the user even being aware that it has been reset. So use something random, and different for each ops$ account. I like to pick a 3 or 4 digit (or larger) number and then spell it out in words. Example: two_thousand_three_hundred_eleven. *Nobody* including you will remember *that*, and it's pretty hard to guess! Received on Tue Dec 15 1992 - 15:42:20 CET

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