Re: does a table always need a PK?
Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2003 07:55:52 GMT
Message-ID: <cij2b.2808$3E.2443_at_newsread3.news.pas.earthlink.net>
"Daniel Guntermann" <guntermann_at_earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:UBh2b.2327$Jh2.1335_at_newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net...
>
> "Tux" <jan.hidders_at_pandora.be> wrote in message
> news:S5x1b.81779$F92.8430_at_afrodite.telenet-ops.be...
> > etp wrote:
> > >
> > > If I want to model say a book where I have a root element of book
> > > represented as n pages, can I do something like this:
>
> [..]
>
> > Bitte.
> >
> > -- Jan Hidders
> >
> > PS. Homework: Explain the relationship between Wittgensteins famous last
> > proposition (#7) in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and the
> > requirement that every table should have at least one candidate key.
> >
>
> Its very nice to see you back! I see you haven't lost your penchant for
> opening new ways of looking at things.
>
> I've taken your challenge and some time to read about Wittgenstein and the
> Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. Though philosophy and logic aren't
exactly
> my strong suites, I find myself further and further drawn in as I get more
> involved with the semantics of data over time. This is a great reference
> for which I intend to invest some time to digest.
>
> I interpreted #7, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent",
to
> mean, in a nutshell, there are things that can't be expressed in words or
> language, like things that are mystical; or spiritual; or that exist in
some
> reality, but are not existent in our minds, and thus are not expressible
(as
> a proposition), but perhaps showable. My interpretation seems much
broader
> and generalized than that linkage you imply in your question.
>
> Perhaps I need to get a better background in logic. Your reference gave
me
> cause to read the introduction by Bertrand Russell [1]; a treat unto
itself.
> I guess his explanation seems relevant to your point:
>
> "Thus, logic has two problems to deal with in regard to Symbolism: (1)
> the conditions for sense rather than nonsense in combinations of words;
(2)
> the conditions for uniqueness of meaning or reference in symbols or
> combinations of symbols. A logically perfect language has rules of syntax
> which prevent nonsense, and has single symbols which always have a
definite
> and unique meaning. Mr. Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for
a
> logically perfect language -- not that any language is logically perfect,
or
> that we believe ourselves capable, here and now, of constructing a
logically
> perfect language, but that the whole function of language is to have
> meaning, and it only fulfills this function in proportion as it approaches
> to the ideal language which we postulate."
>
> He notes that a causal reader might misinterpret Wiggenstein's readings
> without a logician's background.
>
> Regards,
>
> Daniel Guntermann
>
> [1] http://www.kfs.org/~jonathan/witt/aintro.html
>
>
>
Received on Mon Aug 25 2003 - 09:55:52 CEST