RE: DBAs running root.sh

From: Herring, David <HerringD_at_DNB.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2014 17:07:17 -0600
Message-ID: <AD8FE6616C097545A4C9A8B0792909AC2E6BADBFBD_at_DNBEXCH01.dnbint.net>



Well, having access to run anything as "root" is a huge hole, especially if you can connect directly to a shared account since it's that much harder to track down who ran it. Who is to say that instead of running "root.sh" you instead do "rm root.sh; ln -s <some scary script> root.sh" first? Now "root.sh" is really a link to something else and you've got full "root" for it. Just an example of what others have referred to in this thread in more general ways.

Why would we do the above? Besides as a way to get around not having access to run "root.sh" (using other "sudo"-granted access) we wouldn't. But auditors don't care and if that hole causes an audit failure it could scare away clients, whether justified or not. I guess we have to trust sysadmin more than DBAs.

Dave Herring

From: oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org [mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org] On Behalf Of Luis Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2014 12:08 PM To: stojan.veselinovski_at_gmail.com
Cc: hacketta_57_at_me.com; ORACLE-L
Subject: Re: DBAs running root.sh

This is really an interesting topic, still one thing comes to my mind. We, as DBA, use our sysdba "power" (or other privileged accounts) to handle, the most valuable asset in an organization: Data. That is what really matter. Why do we need "advanced restrictive policies" to execute a script that finishes an Oracle installation when we have a privileged account in the database? Just imagine the damage you can do without any access to a unix shell.. Role separation is ok to me, but sometimes people focus much on it and bureaucracy wins. Luís
http://lcmarques.com

On Wed, Feb 5, 2014 at 10:08 AM, Stojan Veselinovski <stojan.veselinovski_at_gmail.com> wrote: Its an interesting topic and I've had countless hours of discussion with sysadmins about DB servers being managed and run by DBA's. If we wanted to do serious damage we could., regardless of any root account. Any compromise like having sudo to commands is only a step away from kicking out to a root shell and away you go. With the GI stack needing elevated privileges and for most shops its managed and run by DBA's it really does become a bit of a road block. Patching GI, troubleshooting processes, strace, truss, etc, etc. Not sure if there is a perfect answer but in my current place we have sudo to commands and root in "some" places and a good relationship with the sysadmins Stojan
http://www.stojanveselinovski.com/blog

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Cumprimentos,
Luís Marques
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http://www.freelists.org/webpage/oracle-l Received on Wed Feb 12 2014 - 00:07:17 CET

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