Re: Fitch's paradox and OWA

Jesse F. Hughes says...

>Suppose that p is true, but I don't know it. Then p & ~Kp is true.
>But surely, I could not know p & ~Kp. That is, I couldn't know "p is
>true, but I don't know that p is true."
>
>After all, if I know that conjunction, then I know that p is true, so
>how could I know that I don't know that p is true?
>
>The argument seems perfectly clear to me, both formally and
>informally.

I agree. My point is not about the proof, it's about the "knowability principle" that if something is true, then it is possible that it is knowable. That's not a reasonable thing to assume unless we either restrict what sort of propositions we are talking about, or be more explicit about *who* knows what.

I don't have any problem with the proof of Fitch's paradox. It's a valid proof, but I take it as evidence for rejecting the knowability principle.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY