Re: Securing the database from the DBA

leedm777_at_hotmail.com (David M. Lee) wrote in message news:<8df1fe79.0403292233.7a991f15_at_posting.google.com>...
> I've been thinking a lot lately about the additional security
> requirements that the recent onslaught of legislations placed on
> databases (HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, California SB
> 1386).
>
> Specifically, consider the requirements for keeping an audit trail of
> data accesses and modifications. Within Oracle, triggers can be used
> to track DDL, DML, logon, logoff, and a myriad of other interesting
> events. Fine Grain Auditing can be used to audit SQL queries, and can
> be coupled with Flashback so that you can see exactly what was seen by
> those queries.
>
> All of these methods, and many of Oracle's other security features,
> put the responsibility on the shoulders of the DBA. But doesn't this
> also give the DBA the powers to circumvent these measures? Can't he
> delete rows from the audit logs? Can't he disable triggers or FGA
> policies before doing something sneaky? When using the database's
> facilities as your audit trail tool, doesn't the DBA have the
> knowledge and ability to circumvent and cover up _anything_?
>
> What do you do if you want to protect the data from the DBA?
>
> Many companies now have separate security departments, as seen by the
> rise of the 'Chief Security Officer'. If they wanted to put the
> responsibilities of maintaining the database audit trail in the
> security department, would they hire a DBA in that department to watch
> the DBA in the IT department? Or should they use mechanisms outside
> of Oracle for securing the database, such as some third party tool?
>
> Maybe these concerns too far from the real world. Do most companies
> simply let the DBA handle the database security, and worry about
> whether he _should_ be the one handling security only after there is
> an incident?
>
> Thanks for your opinions!
> dave
> <><

Sometimes you have to trust someone.
If you don't trust him/her, fire him/her! BTW, do you also want to secure the system from the system administrator?
Why not do also that?
Why not also secure the system from the security officer or put the whole box in concrete and throw the key away. If you are paranoid, you would better find a job in a less risky area, or stay in bed permanently.

BTW: Most of our customers don't have any password on their application schema's, they seem to rely on firewalls and forget usually the danger comes from within.
In that perspective your approach is utterly silly.

Sybrand Bakker
Senior Oracle DBA Received on Tue Mar 30 2004 - 13:46:10 CEST