Re: Application userid security

On Mon, 15 Apr 2002 09:33:10 +0400, "Vladimir M. Zakharychev" <bob_at_dpsp-yes.com> wrote:

>Again, developers write that application and will know any secret token
>embedded into it. Keeping developers away from production is actually
>not a technical issue - the only way you can do it is to enable auditing
>and track all access to the production database, review it and detect any
>illegal access (whatever this means for your organization), then act
>accordingly (fire them, bring them to court, whatever).
>
>This reminds me of an old story about Bull Systems developing a
>unix-like OS which they intended to certify for A2. When asked, why
>won't they go for A1 right away, project manager answered that they,
>of course, could, but this would be inhumane as they would have to
>shoot all developers...
>
>Keeping developers away from production systems while granting them
>occasional access is impractical. Better solution is to mirror production
>system to a testbed (probably stripping off any sensitive data you want
>to keep secret, or replacing it with fake generated data) and if any problem
>arises, developers may use the mirror to resolve it and then production
>DBA and network admins will roll out the fix into production. Other than
>this, I don't see any other way but auditing (and you will need it anyway
>to be sure there's no unauthorized access).
>
>--
>Vladimir Zakharychev (bob@dpsp-yes.com) http://www.dpsp-yes.com
>Dynamic PSP(tm) - the first true RAD toolkit for Oracle-based internet applications.
>All opinions are mine and do not necessarily go in line with those of my employer.
<snip>
Well, yes I have considered shooting the developers, but am told that does not fit with our companie's policy of inclusiveness. ;-)

Sounds like what you're talking about is preventing them from testing code against production. Our concern is broader -- how to prevent them from manipulating production data.

Looks more and more like my original conclusion was correct -- that what management wants can't be done; the level of security they enjoy on the mainframe is a result of several OS level subsystems. Received on Mon Apr 15 2002 - 07:58:42 CDT