Re: Meltdown and spectre

From: Tim Hall <tim_at_oracle-base.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 17:56:33 +0000
Message-ID: <CAP=5zEhyFeFEKVDLB5OAkA6KN93_P39ReucJ_0rNpxC6wVR54Q_at_mail.gmail.com>



Interesting. I wonder if they were just getting those out of the door quickly, or if there is some other reason for that. I'm sure there will be a blog announcement at some point...

On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Franck Pachot <franck_at_pachot.net> wrote:

> Hi Tim,
>
> It seems there's only the Spectre patches, but not the Meltdown
>
> [root_at_VM120 oracle]# rpm -q kernel-uek
> kernel-uek-4.1.12-112.14.5.el7uek.x86_64
> [root_at_VM120 oracle]# rpm -q --changelog kernel-uek | awk '/CVE-2017-5715|CVE-2017-5753|CVE-2017-5754/{print $NF}' | sort -u
> {CVE-2017-5715}
> {CVE-2017-5753}
>
> Regards,
> Franck.
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 3:05 PM Tim Hall <tim_at_oracle-base.com> wrote:
>
>> Forgot to include this...
>>
>> Removed:
>> kernel-uek.x86_64 0:4.1.12-103.10.1.el7uek
>> kernel-uek-devel.x86_64 0:4.1.12-103.10.1.el7uek
>> kernel-uek-firmware.noarch 0:4.1.12-103.10.1.el7uek
>>
>> Installed:
>> kernel-uek.x86_64 0:4.1.12-112.14.5.el7uek
>> kernel-uek-devel.x86_64 0:4.1.12-112.14.5.el7uek
>> kernel-uek-firmware.noarch 0:4.1.12-112.14.5.el7uek
>>
>> Complete!
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 2:03 PM, Tim Hall <tim_at_oracle-base.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Some UEK4 patches have just appeared that weren't there yesterday. I've
>>> not checked the contents, but it would be rather coincidental if they
>>> weren't related to this. :)
>>>
>>> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 11:51 PM, Hans Forbrich <
>>> fuzzy.graybeard_at_gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 2018-01-05 2:33 PM, Reen, Elizabeth (Redacted sender elizabeth.reen
>>>> for DMARC) wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I have a background in system engineering. I don’t get how a chip can
>>>> be exploited. What code can be hacked there?
>>>>
>>>> For speculative execution, a command is executed that MIGHT be
>>>> required. That command might ask to move stuff into some portion of
>>>> memory, or need a specific page moved in. If that command is then rolled
>>>> back, what happens to the memory that it just filled? (Hint: it's still
>>>> filled in, perhaps with a password.) Back in the day (early 90s) when this
>>>> stuff was dreamt up, the idea of flushing that memory on command rollback
>>>> would not have been a concern - hacking was for fun, not profit, in those
>>>> days. It's not actually the code being hacked, as much as a side effect
>>>> that is not properly handled.
>>>>
>>>> It wasn't just the hardware guys, either. We s/w devs were pretty
>>>> sloppy about things like end-of-arrays and random pointers in our code, and
>>>> few people worried about (or even understood) what happened at the chip
>>>> level. (Remember why Java came into being?)
>>>>
>>>> /Hans
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>

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Received on Sat Jan 06 2018 - 18:56:33 CET

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