RE: Supplied Packages, Database Links, and SQL Injection

Yes, but dba_dependencies needs to be checked and explicit grants made to users such as sysman where appropriate.

Ian

-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Knecht [mailto:knecht.stefan_at_gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, May 09, 2006 11:52 PM
To: JHostetter_at_decommunications.com
Cc: MacGregor, Ian A.; oracle-l
Subject: Re: Supplied Packages, Database Links, and SQL Injection

But be careful, I've encountered several situations where revoking privileges (according to oracle recommendation) breaks certain oracle components. One example is Grid Control, which recommends you to revoke several packages (utl_file, utl_tcp) from public, which in turn breaks Grid Control itself.

Just my 2 cents.

On 5/9/06, Hostetter, Jay M <JHostetter_at_decommunications.com> wrote:

	These are the standard revokes that I issue.  If a user needs it, I
	grant it directly to that user.  I put these revokes right into 
	postDBCreation.sql that is generated by DBCA.
	
	/* Revoke privileges per page 715 of the Admin Manual (Security
	Checklist).  */
	revoke execute on utl_smtp    from public;
	revoke execute on utl_tcp     from public; 
	revoke execute on utl_http    from public;
	revoke execute on utl_file    from public;
	revoke execute on dbms_random from public;
	
	/* From Oracle9i Application Developer's Guide - Fundamentals  Ch. 14 */
	revoke execute on dbms_obfuscation_toolkit from public;
	
	/* Oracle Database Security Benchmark v1.1 */
	revoke execute on dbms_lob from public;
	revoke execute on dbms_job from public;
	
	Some new revokes to consider: 
	
	/* Related to CPUApr2006 -
	http://www.red-database-security.com/advisory/oracle_cpu_apr_2006.html
	*/
	revoke execute on dbms_reputil          from public; 
	revoke execute on dbms_snapshot_utl     from public;
	revoke execute on dbms_export_extension from public;
	
	You are right - it's fairly easy to find existing stored objects that
	will break if you make these revokes.  It's a bit more difficult for the 
	anonymous blocks.  I modified an old query for v$db_object_cache in an
	attempt to find out if one of these packages was called recently.  I'm
	sure somebody could improve upon it:
	
	select owner || '.' || name OBJECT 


	        , type

	        , to_char(sharable_mem/1024,'9,999.9') "SPACE(K)"

	        , loads

	        , executions execs

	        , kept

	from v$db_object_cache
	where name in ('UTL_SMTP','UTL_TCP','UTL_HTTP','UTL_FILE','DBMS_RANDOM', 
	    'DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLSKIT','DBMS_LOB','DBMS_JOB')
	order by owner, name
	;
	
	Jay
	
	-----Original Message-----
	From: oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org 
	[mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org] On Behalf Of MacGregor, Ian A.
	Sent: Tuesday, May 09, 2006 2:18 PM
	To: oracle-l
	Subject: Supplied Packages, Database Links, and SQL Injection 
	
	Certain supplied packages such as dbms_export_extension are flawed, you
	can inject SQL such as "grant dba to me;"  into them and the code will
	be executed.  Now suppose you are pulling data from a database which 
	includes sensitive information to one that does not via a database link.
	No sensitive data is accessible, the account on the sensitive database
	to which the database link connects has no privilege to access the
	sensitive objects.  However there is a package, I'll call it dbms_flawed
	which is exploitable via  SQL injection.  A user runs
	dbms_flawed.exeute_this_at_remote_db('grant dba to me')  thereby gaining
	that privilege or execute dbms_flawed.execute_at_remote_db('grant all on
	trusted_user.cofidential_info_table to me');  The controls setup to
	prevent improper access are bypassed.
	
	The answer is to to not allow "me" to execute dbms_flawed.  However, 
	there are other packages which might now or someday be exploitable.  How
	are folks handling this.  Have you revoked execute privileges from
	public from all packages, a certain set of packages (if so which ones)? 
	Is there a list of packages which have the potential to be exploited.
	Revoking privileges can be tricky.  Dba_dependencies will find  calls
	from stored procedures, but not anonymous blocks.
	
	
	
	Ian MacGregor 
	Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
	ian_at_slac.stanford.edu
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
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