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Re: Client side vulnerabilities (Buffer Overflow)

From: Sybrand Bakker <postbus_at_sybrandb.demon.nl>
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2005 19:34:31 +0200
Message-ID: <2tgob197e9l6rah3c2t19bush2tt2vjsuk@4ax.com>


On 24 Jun 2005 05:04:02 -0700, "David ROBERT" <castlebbs_at_gmail.com> wrote:

>Hello,
>
>I'm interested in Oracle security.
>I've seen the Oracle alerts on the oracle website. A lot of the highly
>critical advisories are about database server itself or the underlying
>operating system command execution.
>
>I'm actually looking about securing an application where :
>- I cannot trust in the Oracle Database server (the listener could be
>replaced by a malicious program).
>- The clients applications needs to be secure. The clients connects the
>database using SQL*Net. Clients are binaries linked : libwtc8.sl,
>libnjni8.sl
>libwtc8.sl,libclntsh.sl.8.0
>
>I haven't seen in the oracle risk matrix the case where a malicious
>listener could exploit a buffer overflow in oracle client libraries.
>
>Do you know about this risk ? Has Oracle released some advisories about
>that ?

Obviously not. As you are probably not aware, the listener is a broker only. As soon as signals the database to fork a process, it's tasks with respect to the connecting client are over.

Your first assertion implies you aren't protecting the server itself.

I would suggest you spend your energy elsewhere.

--
Sybrand Bakker, Senior Oracle DBA
Received on Fri Jun 24 2005 - 12:34:31 CDT

Original text of this message

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