Re: Fitch's paradox and OWA
From: Nam Nguyen <namducnguyen_at_shaw.ca>
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2009 23:26:00 -0700
Message-ID: <0uX_m.25$FY5.2_at_newsfe23.iad>
>
> I didn't say that we can *know* it is true. That's my point---something
> can be true without anyone knowing that it is true. It might be true,
> for example, that there is an even number of grains of sand in the world, but we
> may never find that out. Is e^pi rational? We may never find out.
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2009 23:26:00 -0700
Message-ID: <0uX_m.25$FY5.2_at_newsfe23.iad>
Daryl McCullough wrote:
> Nam Nguyen says...
>> Daryl McCullough wrote: >>> By the way, I haven't thought about it a huge amount, but I >>> don't have any problems with the paradox, because I don't >>> accept the premise: Every true proposition is potentially knowable. >>> It seems to me that sufficiently complex true propositions may never >>> be known. >> But how can we know it's true in the first place, when its being true >> can't be known?
>
> I didn't say that we can *know* it is true. That's my point---something
> can be true without anyone knowing that it is true. It might be true,
> for example, that there is an even number of grains of sand in the world, but we
> may never find that out. Is e^pi rational? We may never find out.
Don't want to beat a dead horse so to speak but not knowing a truth because its proof (knowledge) is _finitely_ larger than what one can possibly know is *not* the same as not knowing a truth value because the statement is not *genuinely* truth-assigned-able. The "sand in the world" being an even number example above is of the 1st kind: not the 2nd kind. Received on Thu Dec 31 2009 - 07:26:00 CET