Re: More on identifiers

From: <>
Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2009 09:00:57 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <>

On Jun 8, 7:25 am, Bernard Peek <> wrote:
> In message <Oo6Wl.770$>, Walter Mitty
> <> writes
> >Consider two electrons.  They both have the same mass, and they have the
> >same charge.  They might have opposite spins.  But the minute we add a third
> >electron, the spin of two of them is going to be identical.  It seems that,
> >on the surface at least, electrons do not have enough properties to carry
> >identity.  As you descend into lower level particles like quarks, things get
> >even more this way.  Particles seem more and more interchangeable.
> >Subatomic particles might not have much to do with your objects in a box,
> >but it seems to me that any theory of reality and identity that falls apart
> >at the subatomic level should at least take that into account.
> I don't think the analogy to electrons is particularly useful here. It's
> not clear that electrons have an attribute called Identity.  Electrons
> in different locations can change places with each other (insofar as the
> concept of place has meaning here.) It's provably impossible to measure
> all of the properties of an electron even if we only consider it as a
> particle. When we add wavelike properties it only gets worse.

This is actually an interesting question worth researching. RL is a nondistributive lattice and lack of distributivity is analogous to that of Von Neumann's quantum logic. However orthomodular (and even more generally orthocomplemented) lattices are incompatible with RL. Adding complement law ( Complemented_lattice) to RL collapses it to boolean algebra. Therefore, no, microworld doesn't fit into relational model. Received on Mon Jun 08 2009 - 18:00:57 CEST

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