Re: Guessing?
From: paul c <toledobysea_at_ac.ooyah>
Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2008 04:18:19 GMT
Message-ID: <fgWdk.93345$gc5.88383_at_pd7urf2no>
>
>
> I find the strong AI hypothesis interesting - ie the question of
> whether it is possible in principle for a computer to be conscious or
> self aware.
>
> I agree that some of the arguments against strong AI are very lame.
> For example Searle says a simulation of mind is not the same thing as
> mind in the same way that a simulation of a hurricane is not the same
> thing as a hurricane. But if mind is computation, isn't a simulation
> of a computation just an isomorphic computation?
>
> My guess is that the strong AI hypothesis is true but the
> repercussions are quite astounding. If mind is computable then it
> follows that there exists Turing Machines representing worlds with
> self aware substructures (SASs) as complex as ourselves. Presumably
> many SASs would be tricked into believing in a distinction between
> platonic existence and their apparent physical existence. By
> application of Occam's Razor I would argue that the (mystical)
> postulate of our own physical existence should be dropped in favour of
> a less presumptuous platonic existence. That's ironic because most
> people would say belief in physical existence is less mystical than
> belief in platonic existence - but each to their own!
>
> The best argument against strong AI that I've seen is the White Rabbit
> Paradox, which basically says that if we are merely computation, in
> the multiverse of all possible mathematical realities or computations
> why don't we see bizarre things happen like white rabbits appear out
> of nowhere. However there is a possible resolution based on
> "probability" (or measure) theories on infinite ensembles. However
> to really be taken seriously the researchers in this area need to
> explain our laws of physics. I do find their simplified explanations
> of some of the bizarre features of Quantum Mechanics interesting - the
> Many Worlds Interpretation of QM seems a natural fit with the ultimate
> ensemble theory. However I'm not sure whether they even have an
> explanation of why Hilbert spaces over complex numbers are so
> important.
>
> Anyway I don't think there has been any compelling argument either for
> or against strong AI.
>
Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2008 04:18:19 GMT
Message-ID: <fgWdk.93345$gc5.88383_at_pd7urf2no>
David BL wrote:
> On Jul 12, 9:27 am, Marshall <marshall.spi..._at_gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Lately I have developed an allergic reaction to various ideas >> asserting >> that brains are somehow magical and mystical, and thought is >> something that we not only can't currently explain computationally, >> but never will be able to explain computationally. It's just bullshit. >> >> Earlier you mentioned "What Computers Still Can't Do." >> >> Reading for example this: >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Computers_Can%27t_Do >> >> I see no argument that doesn't amuse me with its lameness.
>
>
> I find the strong AI hypothesis interesting - ie the question of
> whether it is possible in principle for a computer to be conscious or
> self aware.
>
> I agree that some of the arguments against strong AI are very lame.
> For example Searle says a simulation of mind is not the same thing as
> mind in the same way that a simulation of a hurricane is not the same
> thing as a hurricane. But if mind is computation, isn't a simulation
> of a computation just an isomorphic computation?
>
> My guess is that the strong AI hypothesis is true but the
> repercussions are quite astounding. If mind is computable then it
> follows that there exists Turing Machines representing worlds with
> self aware substructures (SASs) as complex as ourselves. Presumably
> many SASs would be tricked into believing in a distinction between
> platonic existence and their apparent physical existence. By
> application of Occam's Razor I would argue that the (mystical)
> postulate of our own physical existence should be dropped in favour of
> a less presumptuous platonic existence. That's ironic because most
> people would say belief in physical existence is less mystical than
> belief in platonic existence - but each to their own!
>
> The best argument against strong AI that I've seen is the White Rabbit
> Paradox, which basically says that if we are merely computation, in
> the multiverse of all possible mathematical realities or computations
> why don't we see bizarre things happen like white rabbits appear out
> of nowhere. However there is a possible resolution based on
> "probability" (or measure) theories on infinite ensembles. However
> to really be taken seriously the researchers in this area need to
> explain our laws of physics. I do find their simplified explanations
> of some of the bizarre features of Quantum Mechanics interesting - the
> Many Worlds Interpretation of QM seems a natural fit with the ultimate
> ensemble theory. However I'm not sure whether they even have an
> explanation of why Hilbert spaces over complex numbers are so
> important.
>
> Anyway I don't think there has been any compelling argument either for
> or against strong AI.
>
I'd just like to know this: if what you call strong AI is possible and it happened, how would we know? how could we be sure we know? (don't mean to sound like Joe C and Donald R, can't help it.) Received on Sat Jul 12 2008 - 06:18:19 CEST