Re: One-To-One Relationships

From: Marshall <>
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 00:09:02 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <>

On Nov 29, 10:50 pm, David BL <> wrote:
> On Nov 30, 2:54 pm, Marshall <> wrote:
> > On Nov 29, 9:20 pm, David BL <> wrote:
> > > How does one interpret a tuple as a proposition about the real world
> > > if one avoids any conception of entities?
> > How does one interpret a proposition as a proposition about
> > the real world?
> I'm not sure what you mean.
> I didn't state myself clearly. I wasn't intending the formal meaning
> of "proposition". Please substitute a less formal word like "fact" in
> my previous post.

Okay. Let me rephrase my question according to your specifications:

How does one interpret a proposition as a fact about the real world?

I believe that the answer to this question is the same as the answer to the question you asked, which was:

   "How does one interpret a tuple
   as a proposition about the real world    if one avoids any conception of entities?"

The formalism that gives us propositions, and that lets us use them to state facts about the real world, and infer new facts from the stated facts, does not have any conception of entities.

Is it clear what I'm saying?

> > > It seems to me that some entities are inevitable. Can't the distrust
> > > of entities be stated without throwing the baby out with the bath
> > > water?
> > Counter-question: what do you get from entities that you
> > don't get from propositions?
> I would have thought we need both.

That's no excuse for not answering my question. :-)

> By "proposition" do you mean formula from the propositional calculus?
> The propositional calculus is a formalism and doesn't come with some
> mapping back to the real world. I don't understand how any mapping
> could be understood without any conception of entities.

Does that mean you understand the term "entity" to be referring to the conceptual layer? I don't think that's the usual sense of the word.

> Isn't this mapping related to intensional definitions? These are
> typically stated in natural language because they can't be
> formalised. It seems to me that the instantiations of natural
> language intensional definitions are the counterpart to propositions
> being instantiations of predicates, and such natural language
> instantiations always refer to things that are assumed to exist in the
> real world (assuming the RDB is meant to model reality somehow).


So, given all this, do we need to separate out the concepts of entity and relationship at the logical layer? It seems to me the answer is a clear "no."

Since, as you say, the mapping to the real world cannot be formalized, I figure anyone can go ahead and think about it however they like.

Marshall Received on Fri Nov 30 2007 - 09:09:02 CET

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