Re: Database design

Christopher Browne <cbbrowne_at_acm.org> wrote:

>>> Is that intrinsic order the order in which they served? (If so,
>>>what about Grover Cleveland?)

>> Why parenthetical? And why would he not be listed? Is it that you
>> don't know if the RM, or whatever you have in mind, could handle the
>> scalars - 22, and 24? Could be a roster of local mayors, councilmen,
>> what have you.

>He is a perfect characteristic case for the problem that the ordering
>of presidents is an ambiguous matter.

>Question: How do you handle the relative ordering of Grover Cleveland
>and Benjamin Harrison's presidencies?

>Cleveland served BOTH before and after Harrison, which means that
>there is NOT a clear order on a by-president basis.

No, not in terms of a non-network tree. A list. A roster.

> a) Cleveland served before Harrison, and
> b) Cleveland served after Harrison.

Joe was mayor, then Alice, then Alice again, then Joe, then Fred.

>An attempt to order *by president* breaks down in general, and here,
>in specific, due to the fact that terms are not forcibly required to
>be consecutive.

But that is precisely the relationship, here, the roster, the sequential, successive occupants of the office within some period of time.

>>>>relation can NEVER be sorted?

>>> The *data* in the relation can be sorted.

>> Now wait a minute. Obviously - yes. But this theory is supposed to
>> hold that a relation cannot be sorted, and cannot store the data in
>> proper order.

>According to the theory, relations are unordered sets of facts.

But according to someone else, here, sets are always unordered. It's simply redundant to speak of unordered sets, by that thinking. And the relation, itself, is said to correspond to a set, though I'm not sure that's true. It contains entities, or tuples, instances, records, what have you, which consists of fields, attributes, again, what have you. So you would phrase it, a relation is a set of sets which members are 2-tuples each being a name and value. In other words, the tuples are not in any order.

>Your need for "proper order" is a fabrication in your own mind.

My need for my own that is mine, etc. Look, let's take this very sentence.

Your need for "proper order" is a fabrication in your own mind.

If those words appear in any other order then they will say to you something else, or nothing at all. Let's experiment:

Your "proper" mind for "order" fabrication is in your own need.

That almost seems to say something. But certainly, at any rate, this is not saying the same thing. And it could easily be changed to mean nothing at all, by anyone's take on it. That's the "fabrication", here. That ordering is essential both syntactically and sematically. You cannot say that you have stored the data, if you have not saved that.

>>>>To become a set, the most important attribute of that set must be
>>>>discarded?

>>> What attribute is that?

>> His position in the lineup. And any changes during the game must also
>> be approved. That attribute. The sort. The proper order.

>You are assuming there to be a unique position; in the case of
>Cleveland's presidential service, there isn't one. There isn't a
>"proper order" because the attempt to force these facts into a "proper
>order" requires breaking the facts.

How? He's simply listed twice. These were different terms. If the mayor serves and then runs for Congress, and loses, he might take time off. He tries again, is a sentimental favorite, and reigns once more, many years later. So, what, we list the poor guy the first time, and strike his name from the roster, the next? This happens all the time.

>>> Why do you consider the order to be the most important
>>> attribute?

>> Game's got rules.

>Ordering is not one of the necessary rules.

Yes, but will you still say that if I intentionally change it to read:

Ordering is necessary, rules one is of the not.

Everything in its proper order. And that seems to be considered not merely a luxury in such a model that you defend, but an irrelevancy. And that makes such a model - itself - rather irrelevant. Does it not?

There is a reality. By comparison, theoretical physics may appear to be a lot of assertion and imagining and such. But there is something against which the theory is tested, something that makes the equations right or wrong. And that's physical reality. The experimentalist can well keep the theorist honest. But both conform to what . . is. They don't just throw stuff out because suddenly is makes the model uncomfortable (well, I mean, some do, but eventually . . you know, eventually, they might become the minority). Received on Thu Feb 23 2006 - 08:11:10 CET