Client/Server ORACLE 6 security issues

From: Andrew Jones (lrpr_at_unb.ca) <LRPR_at_UNB.CA>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 1993 21:21:59 GMT
Message-ID: <05APR93.18755956.0053_at_UNBVM1.CSD.UNB.CA>


        Hello! I am currently in the design stages of a project using ORACLE version 6 RDBMS and SQL*net V6.0.36.1.1 to have DOS 5.0 PC's do client access (using ORACLE DOS tools) to the database server on a UNISYS U6000/65 (SVR4) box. The problem is one of security. We'll have DCA/RLN (Remote Lan Node) access for dial-up customers, who'll be querying the DB. There will be ORACLE permit security which will prevent users from doing unauthorized things like deleting from tables they shouldn't. However, there will also be things which would be easily handled with stored procedures and triggers (like: update this table with a charge record whenever that table is selected from) which can only (I believe) be done in ORACLE 6 via the application logic. What scares me is a user who fires up SQL*Plus as a DOS tool and then connects to the DB; since they don't really log on to UNIX there's no UNIX security, and the database making a SQL*net connection can't tell if it's an application or an interactive interface connected to it. Thus, they might do things which the application must be able to (like insert rows in a table) without the application-based integrity constraints. The best thing I can think of so far is to have them enter an application password, which is decrypted by a C program; it would then connect to a the database with a password which never appears as a file on the PC. However, a good hacker could dissassemble the encryption algorithm, leaving me exposed. Anybody have an experience with this?

Thanks in advance!

Andrew Jones,
New Brunswick Geographic Information Corporation, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada
E-mail: LRPR _at_ UNB.CA Received on Mon Apr 05 1993 - 23:21:59 CEST

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