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Re: Can oracle support encryption on some sensitive field in database?

From: Pete Finnigan <pete_at_peterfinnigan.demon.co.uk>
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 16:32:18 +0000
Message-ID: <E$vAJPASWo+7EwmD@peterfinnigan.demon.co.uk>


Hi Allen

I agree with what you say, but in 8.1.7 the dbms_obfuscation_toolkit package supports 56, 112 and 168 bit keys the triple DES supporting 16 byte ( 2key ) and 24 byte ( 3 key ). The triple DES and MD5 only being available in 8.1.7 and higher and DES in 8.1.6 and higher.

What i was trying to say quite badly as it turned out is that 168 bit using 3 key is available as well, although i do admit it looks like i was saying 3DES is only 168 bit, 3 key and 2 key is not available.

The main point i wanted to make anyway is that its a symmetrical algorithm and using a public algorithm might be better.

regards,
Pete

In article <9e3d4fab.0111200753.3e75619f_at_posting.google.com>, Allen Kistler <ackistler_at_yahoo.com> writes
>Pete Finnigan <pete_at_peterfinnigan.demon.co.uk> wrote in message news:<iAD5GcAp0n
>87EwAO_at_peterfinnigan.demon.co.uk>...
>> Hi
>>
>> Actually the 3DES is triple DES and has a 168 bit key, not 112, but its
>> still DES and is known to be a weak algorithm as its symmetrical. You
>> would be better using a public algorithm that uses public and private
>> keys.
>
>This is a slight digression, but ....
>
>3DES uses two 56-bit keys, hence 3DES essentially has a 112-bit key.
>
>M = cleartext
>C = ciphertext
>K1 = first key
>K2 = second key
>
>Start with M
>Encrypt with K1
>Decrypt with K2
>Encrypt with K1
>You get C
>
>Why not use three keys (K1, K2, and K3)?
>Because then it's possible to find two keys (K1' and K2') which give
>you the same result. In fact there are exactly 2^56 sets of such
>keys. So even though you used 168 bits worth of keys, you only got
>112 bits worth of encryption.
>
>So if you only get 112 bits worth of encryption anyway, why do the
>last encryption step?
>Because if you don't, there are about 2^55 sets of (K1' and K2') that
>produce the same result. So even though you used 112 bits worth of
>keys, you only got about 57 bits worth of encryption.

-- 
Pete Finnigan
IT Security Consultant
PenTest Limited

Office  01565 830 990
Fax     01565 830 889
Mobile  07974 087 885

pete.finnigan_at_pentest-limited.com

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Received on Tue Nov 20 2001 - 10:32:18 CST

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