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Re: SYS/SYSTEM account security - newbie Q

From: Sybrand Bakker <postbus_at_sybrandb.demon.nl>
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 1999 21:15:28 +0100
Message-ID: <3696675F.D44A70E@sybrandb.demon.nl>


Responses embedded

cbeyer_at_my-dejanews.com wrote:

> I am an auditor -- not a techie. Based upon my research I recommended to
> better secure the SYS/SYSTEM accounts (e.g. turn over password to IPO and
> activate only when needed.)in order to prevent intentional or UNintential
> changes to the database. Auditee responded that:
>
> To shutdown, DBAs connect through Oracle's Server Manager (which connnects as
> SYS.) Server Mgr is avail to all in DBA group in any DBA (through SM) can do
> same things as if connected as SYS/SYSTEM.

This is not the complete story. Anyone (assuming auditee is running Unix) in the unix dba group can use the internal pseudo account to connect. They also won't need to specify a password as they are in the dba group. The internal account is going to be obsolete soon. In order to shutdown the database and maintain the physical database you need to have SYSDBA privilege. By default the internal account and the SYS accounts are the only accounts with SYSDBA privilege. In order to make the system more secure at least 1 account with sysdba privilege should be setup. Access to sys and system should be avoided as much as possible.

>
>
> DBAs use SYS/SYSTEM to view X$ tables. CAN'T THEY ALSO DO AS DBA?
>

> Yes of course. In version 7 databases anyone with select any table privilege
> can
>

> Are we correct in assuming the more secure the SYS/SYSTEM accounts the less
> risk there is to the database?

Yes

> Are there any reasons why these accounts
> shouldn't be secured (e.g. give out password only when needed)?

No, except laziness (sorry! The real reason of course is that Oracle security is getting a little bit complex and they want to avoid to have to find out what the exact possibilities are. Grant all developers dba privilege and they won't complain anymore. Of course security will be compromised as all developers can destroy the database (they still won't able to shut it though). I've seen that many times)

> Are they
> other BETTER ways to reach the same end goal (e.g. accountability for
> actions, limit opportunities to do intential or unintentional damage to
> database?

See my remarks about creating an user with sysdba privilige.

>
>
> Any assistance would be greatly appreciated!! Thanks!
>

Hth,

Sybrand Bakker, Oracle DBA

>
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Received on Fri Jan 08 1999 - 14:15:28 CST

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