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Re: Tough question for oracle DBAs/Solaris Admins. Log shipping.

From: <jKILLSPAM.schipper_at_math.uu.nl>
Date: 08 Sep 2006 23:37:56 GMT
Message-ID: <4501fed4$0$80182$dbd43001@news.wanadoo.nl>

In comp.unix.bsd.openbsd.misc tedu <tu_at_zeitbombe.org> wrote:

> Casper H.S. Dik wrote:
>> jKILLSPAM.schipper_at_math.uu.nl writes:
>> >Finally, note the aforementioned problem with immutable files - you can
>> >always mount another file system over the parent directory (in OpenBSD,
>> >obviously).
>>
>> Sounds like a bug.

>
> immutability is an attribute of the inode. mounting does not affect
> the inodes of the covered filesystem. it would be silly to think the
> attribute applied to a filename. file permissions do not apply to the
> name, why would you expect what amounts to a read-only flag to be
> different?
>
> i think this is a common misperception. the point of securelevels and
> immutable files is so that after a machine is compromised, you can turn
> it off, unplug it, turn it back on, and know that everything is back to
> a pre-compromise state [provided the right pieces were immutable] so
> that you can trust the output of ls. it is not to make exec("/bin/ls")
> always run the exact binary you're hoping for while an intruder is
> poking around at the same time.

Indeed, that's exactly the point why I don't see why so many people seem to think this is a big issue, or even are surprised over this.

Really, a security-conscious *nix-admin *needs* to know how the *nix filesystem works, and any other *nix-admin too, probably.

Oh well. At least this wasn't 'fixed' in OpenBSD.

                Joachim Received on Fri Sep 08 2006 - 18:37:56 CDT

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