Oracle FAQ Your Portal to the Oracle Knowledge Grid
HOME | ASK QUESTION | ADD INFO | SEARCH | E-MAIL US
 

Home -> Community -> Mailing Lists -> Oracle-L -> alert #51 more detail

alert #51 more detail

From: Ray Stell <stellr_at_cns.vt.edu>
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2003 10:18:54 -0800
Message-ID: <F001.0054F68A.20030217101854@fatcity.com>

Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2003 14:09:56 -0800
To: bugtraq_at_securityfocus.com
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4807.1700

NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory

Name: Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release 1, 8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6
Severity: Critical Risk
Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
Author: Mark Litchfield (mark_at_ngssoftware.com) Date: 16th February 2003
Advisory number: #NISR16022003a

Description



Oracle is the leader in the database market with a 54% market share lead under ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning). The database server is vulnerable to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability. What exacerbates this problem is that no valid User ID or password is required by an attacker.

Details



There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the authentication process with the Oracle Database Server. By supplying an overly long username when attempting to log onto the database server an attacker can overflow a stack based buffer overwriting the saved return address. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete compromise of the operating system. As most client applications for Oracle will tuncate the length of the username that can be supplied to the database an attacker would need to write their own Oracle "Authenticator" to exploit this issue. That said, NGSSoftware has found one client application that will allow longer usernames so to test if you are vulnerable to this issue, use the LOADPSP utility usually found in "bin" directory found under the OracleHomeInstallDirectory. On Windows, for example, run:

C:\ora9ias\BIN>loadpsp -name -user LONGUSERNAME/tiger_at_iasdb myfile

Fix Information



NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002. Oracle has reviewed the code and created a patch which is available from:

http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert51.pdf

NGSSoftware advise Oracle database customers to review and install the patch as a matter of urgency.

A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite

http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html

It is further recommend that Oracle DBAs have their network/firewall administrators ensure that the database server is protected from Internet sourced traffic.

Further Information



For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows, please see
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf

About NGSSoftware



NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware have offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. NGSSoftware's sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting services, specialising in application, host and network security assessments.

http://www.ngssoftware.com/
http://www.ngsconsulting.com/

Telephone +44 208 401 0070
Fax +44 208 401 0076

enquiries_at_ngssoftware.com

--



Ray Stell stellr_at_vt.edu (540) 231-4109 KE4TJC 28^D
--

Please see the official ORACLE-L FAQ: http://www.orafaq.net
--

Author: Ray Stell
  INET: stellr_at_cns.vt.edu
Fat City Network Services    -- 858-538-5051 http://www.fatcity.com
San Diego, California        -- Mailing list and web hosting services
---------------------------------------------------------------------
To REMOVE yourself from this mailing list, send an E-Mail message to: ListGuru_at_fatcity.com (note EXACT spelling of 'ListGuru') and in the message BODY, include a line containing: UNSUB ORACLE-L (or the name of mailing list you want to be removed from). You may also send the HELP command for other information (like subscribing). Received on Mon Feb 17 2003 - 12:18:54 CST

Original text of this message

HOME | ASK QUESTION | ADD INFO | SEARCH | E-MAIL US